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We investigate the role of sectoral dierences in labor productivity in explaining the process
of structural transformation { the secular reallocation of labor across sectors { and the time
path of aggregate productivity across countries. Using a simple model of the structural
transformation that is calibrated to the growth experience of the United States, we measure
sectoral labor productivity dierences across countries. Productivity dierences between
rich and poor countries are large in agriculture and services and smaller in manufacturing.
Moreover, over time, productivity gaps have been substantially reduced in agriculture and
industry but not nearly as much in services. In the model, these sectoral productivity
patterns generate implications that are broadly consistent with the cross-country evidence
on the structural transformation, aggregate productivity paths, and relative prices. We show
that productivity catch-up in industry explains about 50 percent of the gains in aggregate
productivity across countries, while low relative productivity in services and the lack of
catch-up explains all the experiences of slowdown, stagnation, and decline observed across
countries.
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11 Introduction
It is a well-known observation that over the last 50 years countries have experienced remark-
ably dierent paths of economic performance.1 Looking at the behavior of GDP per hour
of individual countries relative to that of the United States we nd experiences of sustained
catch-up, catch-up followed by a slowdown, stagnation, and even decline (see Figure 1 for
some illustrative examples).2 Consider for instance the experience of Ireland. Between 1960
and 2004, GDP per hour in Ireland relative to that of the United States rose from about 35
percent to about 75 percent.3 Spain also experienced a period of rapid catch-up to the United
States from 1960 to around 1990, a period during which relative GDP per hour rose from
about 35 to 80 percent. Around 1990, however, this process slowed-down dramatically and
relative GDP per hour in Spain stagnated and later declined. Another remarkable growth
experience is that of New Zealand where GDP per hour fell from about 70 to 60 percent of
that of the United States between 1970 and 2004.
Along their modern path of development countries undergo a process of structural trans-
formation by which labor is reallocated among agriculture, industry, and services. Over
the last 50 years many countries have experienced substantial amounts of labor reallocation
across sectors. For instance, from 1960 to 2004, the share of hours in agriculture in Spain
fell from 44 to 6 percent while the share of hours in services rose from 25 to 64 percent. In
about the same period, the share of hours in agriculture in Belgium fell just from 7 to 2
percent, while the share in services rose from 43 to 72 percent.
In this paper we study the behavior of GDP per hour over time from the perspective
of sectoral productivity and the structural transformation.4 Does a sectoral analysis con-
tribute to the understanding of aggregate productivity paths? At a qualitative level, the
answer to this question is clearly yes. Since aggregate labor productivity is the sum of labor
1See Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1996), Jones (1997), Prescott (2002), Duarte and Restuccia (2006),
among many others.
2We use GDP per hour as our measure of economic performance. Throughout the paper we refer to labor
productivity, output per hour, and GDP per hour interchangeably.
3All numbers reported refer to trended data using the Hodrick-Prescott lter. See Section 2 for details.
4See Baumol (1967) for a discussion of the implications of structural change on aggregate productivity
growth.
2productivity across sectors weighted by the share of labor in each sector, the structural trans-
formation matters for aggregate productivity. At a quantitative level the answer depends on
whether there are substantial dierences in sectoral labor productivity across countries. Our
approach in this paper is to rst develop a simple model of the structural transformation
that is calibrated to the growth experience of the United States. We then use the model to
measure sectoral labor productivity dierences across countries at a point in time. These
measures, together with data on sectoral labor productivity growth, imply time paths of
sectoral labor productivity across countries. We use these measures of sectoral productivity
in the model to assess their quantitative role on the structural transformation and aggregate
productivity outcomes across countries.
We nd that there are large and systematic dierences in sectoral labor productivity
across countries. In particular, dierences in labor productivity levels between rich and
poor countries are larger in agriculture and services than in manufacturing. Moreover, over
time, productivity gaps have been substantially reduced in agriculture and industry but
not nearly as much in services. To illustrate the implications of these sectoral dierences
for aggregate productivity, imagine that these productivity dierences remain constant as
countries undergo the structural transformation. Then as developing countries reallocate
labor from agriculture to manufacturing, aggregate productivity can catch-up as labor is
reallocated from a low relative productivity sector to a high relative productivity sector.
Instead, countries further along the structural transformation can slowdown, stagnate, and
decline as labor is reallocated from industry (a high relative productivity sector) to services
(a low relative productivity sector). When the time series of sectoral productivity are fed
into the model of the structural transformation, we nd that high labor productivity growth
in industry relative to that of the United States explains about 50 percent of the catch-up in
relative aggregate productivity across countries. Although there is substantial catch-up in
agricultural productivity, we show that this factor contributes little to aggregate productivity
gains. In addition, we show that low relative productivity in services and the lack of catch-
up explains all the experiences of slowdown, stagnation, and decline in relative aggregate
productivity observed across countries.
3We construct a panel data set on PPP-adjusted real output per hour and disaggregated
output and hours worked for agriculture, industry, and services. Our panel data includes
29 countries with data covering the period from 1956 to 2004 for most countries.5 From
these data, we document three basic facts. First, countries follow a common process of
structural transformation characterized by a declining share of hours in agriculture over
time, an increasing share of hours in services, and a hump-shaped share of hours in industry.
Second, there is substantial lag in the process of structural transformation for some countries
and this lag is associated with the level of relative income. Third, there are sizable and
systematic dierences in sectoral growth rates of labor productivity across countries. In
particular, most countries observe higher growth rates of labor productivity in agriculture
and manufacturing compared to services. In addition, countries with high growth rates of
aggregate productivity tend to have much higher productivity growth in agriculture and
manufacturing than the United States, but this strong relative performance is not observed
in services. Countries with low growth rates of aggregate labor productivity tend to observe
low labor productivity growth in all sectors.
We develop a simple general equilibrium model of the structural transformation with three
sectors   agriculture, industry, and services. Following Rogerson (2008), labor reallocation
across sectors is driven by two channels: income eects due to non-homothetic preferences
and substitution eects due to dierential productivity growth across sectors.6 We calibrate
the model to the structural transformation of the United States between 1956 and 2004.
A model of the structural transformation is essential for the purpose of this paper for two
reasons. First, we use the calibrated model to measure sectoral productivity dierences
across countries at one point in time. This step is needed because of the lack of comparable
(PPP-adjusted) sectoral output data across a large set of countries. Second, the process of
structural transformation is endogenous to the level and changes over time in sectoral labor
productivity. As a result, a quantitative assessment of the aggregate implications of sectoral
5Our sample does not include the poorest countries in the world: the labor productivity ratio between
the richest and poorest countries in our data is only 10.
6For recent models of the structural transformation emphasizing non-homothetic preferences see
Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001) and emphasizing substitution eects see Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
4productivity dierences requires that changes in the distribution of labor across sectors be
consistent with sectoral productivity paths.
The model implies that sectoral productivity levels in the rst year in the sample tend
to be lower in poor than in rich countries, particularly so in agriculture and services. In-
terestingly, the model implies low dispersion in productivity levels in manufacturing across
countries. We argue that these dierences in sectoral labor productivity implied by the
model are consistent with the available evidence from studies using producer and micro data
for specic sectors, for instance Baily and Solow (2001) for manufacturing and service sectors
and Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) for agriculture. The levels of productivity implied by
the model together with data on sectoral labor productivity growth for each country, imply
time paths for sectoral productivity in each country. Given these time paths for productivity,
the model reproduces the broad patterns of labor reallocation and aggregate productivity
growth across countries. The model also has implications for sectoral output and relative
prices that are broadly consistent with the cross-country data.
This paper is related to a large literature studying income dierences across countries.
Closely connected is the literature studying international income dierences in the context
of models with delay in the start of modern growth.7 Since countries in our data set have
started the process of structural transformation well before the rst year in the sample pe-
riod, our focus is on measuring sectoral productivity across countries at a point in time
and on assessing the role of their movement over time in accounting for the patterns of
structural transformation and aggregate productivity growth across countries.8 Our paper is
also closely related to a literature that emphasizes the sectoral composition of the economy
in aggregate outcomes, for instance Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008), C ordoba and Ripoll
(2004), Vollrath (2009), Chanda and Dalgaard (2005), Coleman (2007), and Adamopoulos
and Akyol (2007).9 In studying labor productivity over time, our paper is related to a litera-
7See, for instance, Lucas (2000), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Ngai (2004), and Gollin, Parente, and
Rogerson (2002).
8Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2006) also consider a model to measure sectoral productivity dierences
across countries but instead use expenditure data from the Penn World Table.
9See also Caselli and Tenreyro (2006) and the survey article by Caselli (2005).
5ture studying country episodes of slowdown and depression.10 Most of this literature focuses
on the role of exogenous movements in aggregate total factor productivity and aggregate
distortions on GDP relative to trend. We dier from this literature by emphasizing the
importance of sectoral labor productivity on the structural transformation and the secular
movements in relative GDP per hour across countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we document some facts about the
process of structural transformation and sectoral labor productivity growth across countries.
Section 3 describes the economic environment and calibrates a benchmark economy to U.S.
data for the period between 1956 to 2004. In section 4 we discuss our quantitative experiment
and perform counterfactual analysis. We conclude in section 5.
2 Some Facts
In this section, we document the process of structural transformation and labor productivity
growth in agriculture, industry, and services for the countries in our data set at an annual
frequency. Since we focus on long-run trends, data are trended using the Hodrick-Prescott
lter with a smoothing parameter  = 100. The appendix provides a detailed description of
the data.
2.1 The Process of Structural Transformation
The reallocation of labor across sectors over time is typically referred to in the economic
development literature as the process of structural transformation. This process has been
extensively documented.11 The structural transformation is characterized by a systematic
fall in the share of labor allocated to agriculture over time, by a steady increase in the share
of labor in services, and by a hump-shaped pattern for the share of labor in manufacturing.
That is, the typical process of sectoral reallocation involves an increase in the share of labor
in manufacturing in the early stages of the reallocation process, followed by a decrease in
10See Kehoe and Prescott (2002) and the references therein.
11See, for instance, Kuznets (1966), Maddison (1980), among others.
6the later stages.12
We document the processes of structural transformation in our data set by focusing on
the distribution of labor hours across sectors. We note, however, that this characterization is
very similar to the one obtained by looking at shares of employment. Our panel data covers
countries at very dierent stages in the process of structural transformation. For instance,
our data includes countries that in 1960 allocated about 70 percent of their labor hours to
agriculture (e.g., Turkey and Bolivia), as well as countries that in the same year have shares
of hours in agriculture below 10 percent (e.g., the United Kingdom). Despite this diversity
in the stage of structural transformation across the sample, all countries follow a common
process of structural transformation. First, all countries exhibit declining shares of hours in
agriculture, even the most advanced countries in this process, such as the United Kingdom
and the United States. Second, countries at an early stage of the process of structural trans-
formation exhibit a hump-shaped share of hours in industry, while this share is decreasing
for countries at a more advanced stage. Finally, all countries exhibit an increasing share
of hours in services. To illustrate these features, Figure 2 plots sectoral shares of hours for
Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Canada.
The processes of structural transformation observed in our sample suggest two additional
observations. First, the lag in the structural transformation observed across countries is
systematically related to the level of development: poor countries are the ones with the
highest shares of hours in agriculture, while rich countries are the ones with the lowest
shares. (See for instance Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2007) and Restuccia, Yang, and
Zhu (2008) for a detailed documentation of this fact for shares of employment across a wider
range of countries.) Second, our data suggest the basic tendency for countries that start the
process of structural transformation later to accomplish a given amount of labor reallocation
faster than those countries that initiated this process earlier.13
12In this paper we refer to manufacturing and industry interchangeably. In the appendix we describe in
detail our denition of sectors in the data.
13According to the U.S. Census Bureau (1975), Historical Statistics of the United States, the distribution
of employment in the United States circa 1870 resembles that of Portugal in 1950. By 1948 the sectoral
shares in the United States were 0.10, 0.34, and 0.56, levels that Portugal reached sometime during the
90's. Although Portugal is lagging behind the process of structural transformation in the United States, it
72.2 Sectoral Labor Productivity Growth
For the United States, the annualized growth rate of labor productivity between 1956 and
2004 has been highest in agriculture (3.8 percent), second in industry (2.4 percent), and
lowest in services (1.3 percent).14 This ranking of growth rates of labor productivity across
sectors is observed in 23 out of the 29 countries in our sample and in all countries but
Venezuela the growth rate in services is the smallest. Nevertheless, there is an enormous
variation in sectoral labor productivity growth across countries.
Figure 3 plots the annualized growth rate of labor productivity in each sector against
the annualized growth rate of aggregate labor productivity for all countries in our data set.
The sectoral growth rate of the United States in each panel is identied by the horizontal
dashed line while the vertical dashed line marks the growth rate of aggregate productivity
of the United States. This gure documents the tendency for countries to feature higher
growth rates of labor productivity in agriculture and manufacturing compared to services.
For instance, in our panel, the average growth rates in agriculture and manufacturing are
4.0 and 3.1 percent while the average growth rate in services is 1.3 percent.
Figure 3 also illustrates that countries with low relative aggregate labor productivity
growth tend to have low productivity growth in all sectors (e.g., Latin American countries)
while countries with high relative aggregate labor productivity growth tend to have higher
productivity growth than the United States in agriculture and, specially, industry (e.g.,
European countries, Japan, and Korea). For the countries that grew faster than the United
States in aggregate productivity, labor productivity growth exceeded that of the United
States, on average, by 1 percentage point in agriculture and 1.5 percentage points in industry.
In contrast, labor productivity growth in services for these countries exceeded that of the
United States, on average, by only 0.4 percentage points. The fact is that few countries
have observed a much higher growth rate of labor productivity in services than the United
has accomplished about the same reallocation of labor across sectors in less than half the time (39 years as
opposed to 89 years in the United States). See Duarte and Restuccia (2007) for a detailed documentation
of these observations.







8States. These features of the data motivate some of the counterfactual exercises we perform
in section 4.
3 Economic Environment
We develop a simple model of the structural transformation of an economy where at each
date three goods are produced: agriculture, industry, and services. Following Rogerson
(2008), labor reallocation across sectors is driven by two forces { an income eect due to
non-homothetic preferences and a substitution eect due to dierential productivity growth
between industry and services. We calibrate a benchmark economy to U.S. data and show
that this basic framework captures the salient features of the structural transformation in
the United States from 1956 to 2004.
3.1 Description
Production At each date there are three goods produced: agriculture (a), manufactur-
ing (m), and services (s) according to the following constant returns to scale production
functions:
Yi = AiLi; i 2 fa;m;sg; (1)
where Yi is output in sector i, Li is labor input in sector i, and Ai is a sector-specic
technology parameter.15 When mapping the model to data we associate the labor input Li
with hours allocated to sector i.
We assume that there is a continuum of homogeneous rms in each sector that are
competitive in goods and factor markets. At each date, given the price of good-i output pi
15We note that labor productivity in each sector is summarized in the model by the productivity pa-
rameter Ai. There are many features that can explain dierences over time and across countries in labor
productivity such as capital intensity and factor endowments. Accounting for these sources can provide
a better understanding of labor productivity facts. Our analysis abstracts from the sources driving labor
productivity observations.
9and wages w, a representative rm in sector i solves:
max
Li0
fpiAiLi   wLig: (2)
Households The economy is populated by an innitely-lived representative household of
constant size. Without loss of generality we normalize the population size to one. The
household is endowed with L units of time each period which are supplied inelastically to
the market. We associate L with total hours per capita in the data. The household has




tu(ca;t;ct);  2 (0;1);
where ca;t is the consumption of agricultural goods at date t and ct is the consumption of a
composite of manufacturing and service goods at date t. The per-period utility is given by:
u(ca;t;ct) = alog(at    a) + (1   a)log(ct); a 2 [0;1];
where  a > 0 is a subsistence level of agricultural goods below which the household cannot
survive. This feature of preferences has a long tradition in the development literature and it
has been emphasized as a quantitatively important feature leading to the movement of labor
away from agriculture in the process of structural transformation.16





m;t + (1   b)(cs;t +  s)
 1
 ;
where  s > 0, b 2 (0;1), and  < 1. Given  s, these preferences imply that the income
elasticity of service goods is greater than one. We note that  s works as a negative subsistence
consumption { when the income of the household is low, less resources are allocated to
16See, for instance, Echevarria (1997), Laitner (2000), Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001), Caselli and
Coleman (2001), Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002), and Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008).
10the production of services and when the income of the household increases resources are
reallocated to services. The parameter  s can also be interpreted as a constant level of
production of service goods at home. Our approach to modeling the home sector for services
is reduced form. Rogerson (2008) considers a generalization of this feature where people
can allocate time to market and non-market production of service goods. However, we
argue that our simplication is not as restrictive as it may rst appear since we abstract
from the allocation of time between market and non-market activities. Our focus is on the
determination of aggregate productivity from the allocation of time across market sectors.
Since we abstract from inter-temporal decisions the problem of the household is eectively
a sequence of static problems.17 At each date and given prices, the household chooses















paca + pmcm + pscs = wL:
Market Clearing The demand for labor from rms must equal the exogenous supply of
labor by households at every date:
La + Lm + Ls = L: (4)
Also, at each date, the market for each good produced must clear:
ca = Ya; cm = Ym; cs = Ys: (5)
17Because we are abstracting from inter-temporal decisions such as investment our analysis is not crucially
aected by alternative stochastic assumptions on the time path for labor productivity.
113.2 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices fpa;pm;psg, allocations fca;cm;csg for the house-
hold, and allocations fLa;Lm;Lsg for rms such that: (i) Given prices, rm's alloca-
tions fLa;Lm;Lsg solve the rm's problem in (2), (ii) Given prices, household's allocations
fca;cm;csg solve the household's problem in (3), and (iii) Markets clear: equations (4) and
(5) hold.
The rst order condition from the rm's problem implies that the benet and cost of
a marginal unit of labor must be equal. Normalizing the wage rate to one, this condition





The rst order conditions for consumption imply that the labor input in agriculture is
given by:










When a = 0, the household consumes  a of agricultural goods and labor allocation in agri-
culture depends only on the level of labor productivity in that sector. When productivity in
agriculture increases, labor moves away from the agricultural sector. Such restriction on pref-
erences implies that output and consumption per capita of agricultural goods are constant
over time, implications that are at odds with data. When a > 0 and productivity growth
is positive in all sectors, the share of labor allocated to agriculture converges asymptotically
to a and the non-homothetic terms in preferences become asymptotically irrelevant in the
determination of the allocation of labor. In this case, output and consumption per capita of
agricultural goods grow at the rate of labor productivity.











12This equation can be re-written as:
Lm =
















and La is given by (7).18 Equation (8) re
ects the two forces that drive labor reallocation
between manufacturing and services in the model. First, suppose that preferences are ho-
mothetic (i.e.,  s = 0). In this case, Ls=Lm = x and dierential productivity growth in
manufacturing relative to services is the only source of labor reallocation between these sec-
tors (through movements in x) as long as  is not equal to zero. In particular, when  s = 0,
the model can be consistent with the observed labor reallocation from manufacturing into
services as labor productivity grows in the manufacturing sector relative to services if the
elasticity of substitution between these goods is low ( < 0). Second, suppose that  s > 0
(i.e., preferences are non-homothetic) and that labor productivity grows at the same rate in
manufacturing and services or that  = 0 (i.e., x is constant). In this case, for a given La,
productivity improvements lead to the reallocation of labor from manufacturing into services
(services are more income-elastic). The model allows both channels to be operating during
the structural transformation.
We note that the model abstracts from frictions to labor reallocation in agriculture by as-
suming perfect mobility across sectors. Changes to the extent of labor mobility in agriculture
over time are thought to be important for the structural transformation and the movement
of relative prices. For the purpose of our exercise what is critical is whether frictions aect
labor reallocation in agriculture. For the group of countries and time period in our sample
{ which does not include the poorest countries in the world { there is an almost one-to-one
18When the growth rates of sectoral labor productivity are positive, the model implies that, in the long
run, the share of hours in manufacturing and services asymptote to constants that depend on preference
parameters a, b, , and any permanent level dierence in labor productivity between manufacturing and
services. If productivity growth in manufacturing is higher than in services, then the share of hours in
manufacturing asymptotes to 0 and the share of hours in services to (1   a).
13relationship between changes in labor productivity and labor reallocation in agriculture both
across time and countries. And this relationship is virtually identical across levels of devel-
opment. Therefore, we argue that in our sample labor productivity plays a dominant role in
determining labor allocation in agriculture and, as a result, this motivates our abstraction
from frictions to labor mobility in the analysis. Moreover, in section 4 we show that the
model is able to broadly reproduce the cross-country patterns of labor reallocation across
sectors as well as the changes in relative prices in the data.19
3.3 Calibration
We calibrate a benchmark economy to U.S. data for the period from 1956 to 2004. Our
calibration strategy involves selecting parameter values so that the equilibrium of the model
matches the salient features of the structural transformation for the United States during
this period. We assume that a period in the model is one year. We need to select parameters
values for a, b, ,  a,  s, and the time series of productivity for each sector Ai;t for t from 1956
to 2004 and i 2 fa;m;sg.
We proceed as follows. First, we normalize productivity levels across sectors to one in
1956, i.e., Ai;1956 = 1 for all i 2 fa;m;sg. Then we use data on sectoral labor productivity
growth in the United States to obtain the time paths of sectoral productivity. In particular,
denoting 
i;t the growth rate of labor productivity in sector i at date t, we obtain the time
path of labor productivity in each sector as Ai;t+1 = (1 + 
i;t)Ai;t. Second, with positive
productivity growth in each sector, the share of hours in agriculture in the long-run is given
by a. Since the share of hours in agriculture has been falling systematically and was about 3
percent in 2004, we assume a long-run share of 1 percent. Although this target is somewhat
arbitrary, our main results are not sensitive to this choice. Third, given values for  and
b,  a and  s are chosen to match the shares of hours in agriculture and manufacturing in
the United States in 1956 using equations (7) and (8). Finally, b and  are jointly chosen
to match the share of hours in manufacturing over time and the annualized growth rate
19Distortions or frictions to labor mobility may help the model in explaining some specic country expe-
riences but we leave these interesting explorations for future research.
14of aggregate productivity. The annualized growth rate in labor productivity in the United
States between 1956 and 2004 is roughly 2 percent. Table 1 summarizes the calibrated
parameters and targets.
The shares of hours implied by the model are reported in Figure 4 (dotted lines), together
with data on the shares of hours in the United States (solid lines). The equilibrium allocation
of hours across sectors in the model matches closely the process of structural transformation
in the United States during the calibrated period. The model implies a fall in the share
of hours in manufacturing from about 39 percent in 1956 to 24 percent in 2004, while the
share of hours in services increases from about 49 to 73 percent during this period.20 Notice
that even though the calibration only targets the share of hours in agriculture in 1956 (13
percent), the model implies a time path for the equilibrium share of hours in agriculture that
is remarkably close to the data, declining to about 3 percent in 2004.
The model also has implications for sectoral output and for relative prices. Because sec-
toral output is given by labor productivity times the labor input and the model matches
closely the time path of sectoral labor allocation for the U.S. economy, the output implica-
tions of the model over time for the United States are very close to the data. In particular,
the model implies that output growth in agriculture is 2.08 percent per year (versus 2.29
in the data), while output growth in manufacturing and services in the model are 2.74 and
3.60 percent (versus 2.70 and 3.61 in the data). The model implies that the producer price







We assess the price implications of the model against data on sectoral relative prices.21 The
model implies that the relative producer price of services to industry increases by 0.94 percent
per year between 1971 and 2004, very close to the increase in the data for the relative price
20We emphasize that the model can deliver a hump-shaped pattern for labor in manufacturing for less
developed economies even though during the calibrated period the U.S. economy is already in the second
stage of the structural transformation whereby labor is being reallocated away from manufacturing.
21Data for sectoral relative prices is available from 1971 to 2004. See the appendix for details.
15of services from the implicit price de
ators (0.87 percent per year). The price of agriculture
to manufacturing declines in the model at a rate of 1.04 percent per year from 1971 to 2004.
This fall in the relative price of agriculture is consistent with data although the relative
price of agriculture falls somewhat more in the data than in the model (3.12 percent per
year).22 Since productivity growth across sectors is the driving force of labor reallocation
in the model, it is reassuring that this mechanism generates implications that are broadly
consistent with the data. For this reason, we also discuss in Section 4 the relative price
implications of the model when assessing the relevance of sectoral productivity growth for
labor reallocation in the cross-country data.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we assess the quantitative role of sectoral labor productivity on the structural
transformation and aggregate productivity outcomes across countries. In this analysis, we
maintain preference parameters as in the benchmark economy and proceed in three steps.
First, we use the model to restrict the level of sectoral labor productivity in the rst period
for each country. Second, using these levels and data on sectoral labor productivity growth
in each country as the exogenous time-varying factors, the model implies time paths for the
allocation of hours across sectors and aggregate labor productivity for each country. We
then assess the cross-country implications of the model for labor reallocation across sectors,
aggregate productivity, and relative prices. Third, we perform counterfactual exercises to il-
lustrate the quantitative importance of sectoral analysis in explaining aggregate productivity
experiences across countries.
22We note that in the context of our model distortions to the price of agriculture would not aect substan-
tially the equilibrium allocation of labor in agriculture since this is mainly determined by labor productivity
in agriculture relative to the subsistence constraint (since a is close to zero in the calibration). In this con-
text, it would be possible to introduce price distortions to match the faster decline in the relative price of
agriculture in the data without aecting our main quantitative results.
164.1 Relative Sectoral Productivity Levels
We use the model to restrict the levels of labor productivity in agriculture, industry, and
services relative to those in the United States for the rst year in the sample for each
country. This step is needed because of the lack of comparable (PPP-adjusted) sectoral
output data across a large set of countries. Since our data on sectoral value added are
in constant local currency units some adjustment is needed. Using market exchange rates
would be problematic for arguments well discussed in the literature, e.g. Summers and
Heston (1991). Another approach would be to use the national currency shares of value
added applied to the PPP-adjusted measure of real aggregate output from Penn World
Tables (PWT). This is problematic because it assumes that the same PPP-conversion factor
for aggregate output applies to all sectors in that country, while there is strong evidence
that the PPP-conversion factors dier systematically across sectors in development.23 Using
detailed categories from the International Comparisons Program (ICP) Benchmark data in
the PWT would also be problematic for inferences at the sector level since these data are
based on the expenditure side of national accounts. For instance, it would not be advisable
to use food expenditures and its PPP-conversion factor to adjust units of agricultural output
across countries since expenditures on food include charges for goods and services not directly
related to agricultural production.
Our approach is to use the model to back-out sector-specic PPP-conversion factors
across countries and to use the constant-price value added in local currency units to calculate
growth rates of labor productivity in each sector for each country. In particular, we use the
model to restrict productivity levels in the initial period and use the data on growth rates
of labor productivity to construct the time series for productivity that we feed into the
model. This approach of using growth rates in constant domestic prices as a measure of
changes in \quantities" is similar to the approach followed in the construction of panel data
of comparable output across countries such as the PWT.24
23See for instance the evidence on agriculture relative to non-agriculture in Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu
(2008).
24In particular, in the PWT, the growth rates of expenditure categories such as consumption and invest-
ment are the growth rates of constant domestic price expenditures from national accounts.




s to match 3 targets from the data in the rst year in the sample: (1) the
share of hours in agriculture, (2) the share of hours in manufacturing (therefore the model
matches the share of hours in services by labor market clearing), and (3) aggregate labor
productivity relative to that of the United States.25
Figure 5 plots the average level of sectoral labor productivity relative to the level of
the United States for countries in each quintile of aggregate productivity in the rst year.
The model implies that relative sectoral productivity in the rst year tends to be lower in
poorer countries than in richer countries, but particularly so in agriculture and services.
In fact, the model implies that the dispersion of relative productivity in agriculture and
services is much larger than in manufacturing. In the rst year, the 6 poorest countries have
relative productivity in agriculture and services around 20 and 10 percent while the 6 richest
countries have relative productivity in these sectors around 86 and 84 percent. In contrast,
for manufacturing, average relative productivity of the 6 poorest countries in the rst year
is 31 percent and that of the 6 richest countries is 70 percent.
The levels of sectoral labor productivity implied by the model for the rst year together
with observed growth rates of sectoral labor productivity imply time paths for sectoral
productivity for each country. In particular, letting 

j
i;t denote the growth rate of labor








i;t. Figure 6 plots the average level of sectoral labor productivity relative to
the level in the United States in the rst and last years for countries in each quintile of
aggregate productivity in the rst year. We note that, on average, countries have experienced
substantial gains in productivity in agriculture and industry relative to the United States
(from a relative productivity level of 48 and 51 percent in the rst period to 71 and 75 percent
in the last period). In sharp contrast, countries experienced, on average, much smaller gains
in productivity in services relative to the United States (from a relative productivity level
25We adjust  s by the level of relative productivity in services in the rst period for each country so that
 s=As is constant across countries in the rst period of the sample. Although not modeled explicitly, one
interpretation of  s is as service goods produced at home. Therefore,  s cannot be invariant to large changes
in productivity levels in services.
18of 46 percent to 49 percent). These features are particularly pronounced for countries in the
top 3 quintiles of the productivity distribution. For these countries, average relative labor
productivity in agriculture and industry increased from 66 and 59 percent to 100 and 85
percent, while average productivity in services increased from 63 to only 66 percent. We
emphasize that the relative low levels of productivity in services in the rst period together
with the lack of catch-up over time imply that, for most countries, relative productivity levels
in services are much smaller than those of agriculture and industry at the end of the sample
period. Therefore, as these economies allocate an increasing share of hours to services, low
relative labor productivity in this sector dampens aggregate productivity growth. These
relative productivity patterns are suggestive of the results we discuss in subsection 4.3 where
we show that productivity catch-up in industry explains a large portion of the gains in
aggregate productivity across countries. In addition we show that low relative productivity
levels in services and the lack of catch-up plays a quantitative important role in explaining
the growth episodes of slowdown, stagnation, and decline across countries.
We argue that our productivity-level results are consistent with the available evidence
from studies using producer and micro data. Empirical studies provide internationally-
comparable measures of labor productivity for some sectors and some countries. These
studies typically provide estimates for narrow sectoral denitions at a given point in time.
One such study for agriculture is from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the
United Nations. This study uses producer data (prices of detailed categories at the farm
gate) to calculate international prices and comparable measures of output in agriculture us-
ing a procedure similar to that of Summers and Heston (1991) for the construction of the
PWT. We nd that the labor productivity dierences in agriculture implied by the model
are qualitatively consistent with the dierences in GDP per worker in agriculture between
rich and poor countries from FAO for 1985.26 Baily and Solow (2001) have compiled a wealth
of case studies from the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) documenting labor productivity
dierences in some sectors and countries. Their ndings are broadly consistent with our
26See Restuccia, Yang, and Zhu (2008) for a detailed documentation of the cross-country dierences in
labor productivity in agriculture.
19results. In particular, Baily and Solow emphasize a pattern that emerges from the micro
studies where productivity dierences in services are not only large but also larger than the
dierences for manufacturing across countries. The Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and MGI provide studies at dierent levels of sectoral disaggre-
gation for manufacturing. These studies report relative productivity for a relatively small set
of countries and most studies report estimates only at one point in time. One exception is
Pilat (1996). This study reports relative labor productivity levels in manufacturing for 1960,
1973, 1985, and 1995 for 13 countries. While the implied relative labor productivity levels
in industry in our model tend to be higher than those reported in this study, the patterns of
relative productivity are consistent for most countries. Finally, consistent with our ndings,
several studies report that the United States has higher levels of labor productivity in service
sectors than other developed countries and that lower labor productivity in service sectors
compared to manufacturing is pervasive.27
4.2 The Structural Transformation across Countries
Given growth rates of sectoral labor productivity, the model has time-series implications for
the allocation of labor hours and output across sectors, aggregate labor productivity, and
relative prices for each country. In this section we evaluate these time-series implications of
the model against the available cross-country data.
Overall, the model reproduces the salient features of the structural transformation and
aggregate productivity across countries. To illustrate this performance, Figures 7 and 8
focus on the allocation of hours across sectors and relative aggregate productivity. Figure
7 reports the shares of hours across sectors and relative aggregate productivity in the last
period of the sample for each country in the model and the data. Figure 8 reports the
change between the last and rst period in these variables (in percentage points) for the
model and the data. As these gures illustrate, the model replicates well the patterns of the
27Baily, Farrell, and Remes (2005) for instance estimate that relative to the United States, with the
exception of mobile telecommunications, France and Germany had lower relative productivity levels in 2000
and had lower growth rates of labor productivity between 1992 and 2000 for a set of narrowly-dened service
sectors.
20allocation of hours across sectors and relative aggregate productivity observed in the data,
particularly so for the share of hours in agriculture and relative aggregate productivity. This
performance attests to the ability of the model in replicating the basic trends observed for
the share of hours in agriculture across a large cross-section of countries. Regarding the
share of hours in industry, the model tends to imply a smaller increase over time compared
to the data, particularly so for less developed economies where the share of hours in industry
increased over the sample period. Conversely, the model tends to imply a bigger increase in
the share of hours in services over the sample period than that observed in the data. This
implication of the model suggests that, specially for some less developed countries, distortions
to labor reallocation between industry and services may be important in accounting for their
structural transformation.28 As a summary statistic of the performance of the model in
replicating the time-series properties of the data, we compute the average absolute deviation
(over time and across countries) in percentage points (p.p.) between the time series in the
model and the data in our sample of countries.29 The average absolute deviations for the
shares of hours in agriculture, industry, and services are 2 p.p., 6 p.p., and 7 p.p., and 4 p.p.
for relative aggregate productivity. We conclude that the model captures the bulk of the
labor reallocation and aggregate productivity experiences across countries.
To better understand our nding about aggregate productivity, recall that aggregate
labor productivity is the sum of labor productivity in each sector weighted by the share of











As a result, the behavior of aggregate productivity arises from the behavior of sectoral
28While in most cases the model does well in reproducing the time series in the data, in some countries
modications to the simple model would be required in order to better account for the process of structural
transformation and aggregate productivity growth { see Duarte and Restuccia (2007) for an application
of wedges across sectors in Portugal. These richer environments, however, would require country-specic
analysis. We instead maintain our simple model specication and leave these interesting country-specic
experiences for future research.
29We measure the average absolute deviation in percentage points between the time series in the model







j;t)100, where j is the country index and
Tj is the sample size for country j.
21labor productivity and the allocation of labor across sectors over time.30 Since the model
reproduces the salient features of labor reallocation across countries, aggregate productivity
growth in the model is also broadly consistent with the cross-country data.
The model has implications for sectoral output in each country. Sectoral output is given
by the product of labor productivity and labor hours. As a result, the growth rate of output
in sector i is the sum of the growth rates of labor productivity Ai (which we take from
the data) and the growth in labor hours Li. The fact that the model reproduces well the
cross-country patterns of the structural transformation implies that sectoral output growth
is also well captured by the model.
The model also has implications for levels and changes over time in relative prices across
countries. We rst discuss the implications for changes in relative prices. Figure 9 plots the
annualized percentage change in the prices of agriculture and services relative to manufactur-
ing in the model and the data. The gure shows that the model captures the broad patterns
of price changes in the data { since productivity growth tends to be faster in agriculture
than in industry and in industry than in services in most countries, the tendency is for the
relative price of agriculture to fall and the relative price of services to increase over time.
We note that in the model, the only factors driving price changes over time are the growth
in labor productivity across sectors. Of course, there are many other factors that can drive
price changes over time so the model cannot capture all the changes.
Now we turn to the implications of the model regarding price-level dierences across coun-
tries. Recall that the prices of agriculture and services relative to industry are given by the
inverse of labor productivity (Am=Aa;Am=As). The fact that the dispersion in productivity
across rich and poor countries is large in agriculture and services relative to industry implies
that the relative price of agriculture and services are higher in poor relative to rich countries.
These implications may seem at rst inconsistent with conventional wisdom about price dif-
ferences across countries. We emphasize however that this conventional wisdom steams from
observations about expenditure prices (often from PWT) instead of producer prices. For
30Note that in the above equation, sectoral labor productivity is measured at a common set of prices across
countries.
22instance, the conventional wisdom is that food is cheap in poor countries. This observation
arises when the PPP-expenditure price of food is compared across countries using market
exchange rates. But when the price of food is compared relative to other goods, food appears
expensive in poor countries (see Summers and Heston (1991), page 338). Moreover, food
expenditures include distribution and other charges and the distinction between producer
and expenditure prices may dier systematically across countries.31 In fact, producer-price
data reveals an even more striking conclusion about the price of agriculture across countries:
the evidence from FAO is that prices of agricultural goods are much higher in poor than
in rich countries. This evidence is consistent with our ndings that labor productivity in
agriculture is lower in poor relative to rich countries.
Related is the conventional wisdom that the price of services is higher in rich relative to
poor countries. This view steams again from observations about expenditure prices that may
include a host of distortions that dier across countries (see Summers and Heston (1991)
pages 338 and 339). While there is no systematic producer-price level data for services that
can be compared with the price implications of the model, we focus instead on the indirect
evidence from productivity measurements found in micro studies. Since the lower relative
price of services in rich countries in the model steams from a higher relative productivity in
services than in manufacturing compared to poor countries, we can use the available pro-
ductivity measurements to indirectly assess the price implications of the model for services.
The evidence suggests that labor productivity dierences between rich and poor countries
in services are larger than that of manufacturing industries as discussed by Baily and Solow
(2001) from the McKinsey studies and other OECD studies discussed earlier. This evidence
is consistent with our productivity ndings and therefore with the price implications of the
model. To summarize, while the lack of systematic price-level data prevents a denite con-
clusion about relative price dierences across countries, the available evidence is consistent
with the sectoral productivity ndings and their price-level implications in the model.
31In the United States for instance, for every dollar expended on food, only 20 cents go to the farmer for
the agricultural products.
234.3 Counterfactuals
We construct a series of counterfactuals aimed at assessing the quantitative importance of
sectoral labor productivity on the process of structural transformation and aggregate pro-
ductivity experiences across countries. We focus on two sets of counterfactuals. The rst set
is designed to illustrate the mechanics of positive sectoral productivity growth for labor real-
location and the contribution of productivity growth dierences across sectors and countries
for labor reallocation and aggregate productivity. The second set of counterfactuals focuses
on explaining aggregate productivity growth experiences of catch-up, slowdown, stagnation,
and decline by assessing the contribution of specic cross-country sectoral productivity pat-
terns such as productivity catch-up in agriculture and industry and low productivity levels
and the lack of catch-up in services.
4.3.1 The Mechanics of Sectoral Productivity Growth
We consider counterfactuals where in each case we set the growth rate of labor productivity
in a sector to zero in all countries leaving the remaining growth rates as in the data. These
counterfactuals illustrate the importance of productivity growth in each sector for labor
reallocation and aggregate productivity. Summary statistics for these counterfactuals are
reported in Table 2 and Figure 10. The statistics reported are the change between the
last and rst periods (in percentage points) in the time series of the share of hours in each
sector and relative aggregate productivity. We start with the counterfactual for agriculture
(
a = 0). No productivity growth in agriculture generates no labor reallocation away from
agriculture: there is an average increase in the share of hours in agriculture of 2 percentage
points (p.p.) in the counterfactual instead of a decrease of 26 p.p. in the model. As a
result, much less labor is reallocated to services. This counterfactual has important negative
implications for relative aggregate productivity for most countries regardless of their level of
development: there is an average decline in relative aggregate productivity of 1 p.p. in the
counterfactual instead of the 13 p.p. increase in the model. The eect of the counterfactual
on labor reallocation implies that agriculture represents a larger share of labor than in the
model. As a result, the negative impact of no growth in agriculture on aggregate productivity
24is magnied by the endogenous response of labor. Similarly, positive productivity growth in
agriculture moves labor away from agriculture which dampens the positive impact of growth
in this sector on aggregate productivity gains.
Next we turn to the counterfactual for industry (
m = 0). This counterfactual has no
eect on the share of hours in agriculture (see equation 7). With no productivity growth in
industry there is much less reallocation of labor away from industry into services compared
to the model and thus industry represents a larger share of output in the counterfactual.
As before, the negative impact of no growth in industry on aggregate productivity is mag-
nied by the endogenous response of labor. The result is a process for relative aggregate
productivity that is sharply diminished across countries: an average decline of 7 p.p. in the
counterfactual instead of the catch-up of 13 p.p. in the model. An indeed the largest negative
impact is on countries that observed the most catch-up in relative aggregate productivity in
the model. Finally, no productivity growth in services (
s = 0) has a very small impact on
labor reallocation across sectors.32 Relative aggregate productivity declines by an average
of 2 p.p. in this counterfactual. Note that the negative impact of this counterfactual on
relative aggregate productivity is smaller than that of the case with no productivity growth
in industry for all countries but three (Japan, Portugal, and Venezuela) even though services
account for a larger share of hours than industry in most countries.
In the next counterfactual we assess the quantitative importance of dierences in labor
productivity growth across sectors and countries on aggregate productivity. We set labor
productivity growth in each sector to the growth rate of aggregate labor productivity in
the United States. The forth column in Figure 10 (
i = 
US) documents the results of this
counterfactual for all countries in the sample. (See also Table 2.) The counterfactual has
a substantial impact on the process of structural transformation. In particular, much less
labor is reallocated away from agriculture and industry towards services. For instance, over
the sample period the share of hours in agriculture fell on average 26 p.p. in the model
and 17 p.p. in the counterfactual. In turn, the share of hours in services increased on
32This is due to two opposing eects of productivity growth in services on the labor allocation between
industry and services which roughly cancel each other in the model. See Duarte and Restuccia (2007), page
42, for a detailed discussion of these eects.
25average 36 p.p. in the model and 22 p.p. in the counterfactual. And indeed this dierent
reallocation process together with the assumption about sectoral labor productivity growth
explains a large portion of the experiences of catch-up and decline in aggregate productivity.
For countries that catch-up in aggregate productivity to the United States in the model
over the sample period, the average catch-up is 26 p.p. in the model and only 2 p.p. in the
counterfactual. For countries that declined in relative aggregate productivity in the model
over the sample period, the average decline is 11 p.p. in the model and only 2 p.p. in the
counterfactual.33
We conclude from these counterfactuals that sectoral productivity growth generates sub-
stantial eects on labor reallocation which in turn are important in understanding aggregate
productivity growth across countries.
4.3.2 Sectoral Productivity Patterns and Cross-Country Experiences
We now turn to the second set of counterfactuals where we assess the role of specic la-
bor productivity patterns across sectors in explaining cross-country episodes of catch-up,
slowdown, stagnation, and decline in relative aggregate productivity. As we documented
in Figure 6, there has been a substantial catch-up in labor productivity in agriculture and
industry across countries. To assess the importance of this sectoral catch-up for aggregate
productivity we compute a set of counterfactuals were in each case we set the growth rate of
labor productivity in a sector to the growth rate in that sector in the United States leaving
the other sectors' growth rates as in the data (
i = 
US
i for each i 2 fa;m;sg). For com-
pleteness we also compute a counterfactual were all sectoral growth rates are set to the ones
in the United States (
i = 
US
i 8i). Table 3 summarizes the results for these counterfactuals.
While there has been substantial catch-up of labor productivity in agriculture during the
sample period (from an average relative productivity of 48 percent in the rst period to 71
33Notice that this counterfactual does not eliminate all aggregate productivity growth dierences across
countries even though productivity growth rates are identical across sectors and countries and labor reallo-
cation is much diminished as a result. For instance, in the counterfactual, relative aggregate productivity in
Finland increases by 8 p.p. over the sample period and it decreases by 6 p.p. in Mexico. These movements in
relative aggregate productivity in the counterfactual stem solely from labor reallocation across sectors (due
to positive productivity growth) that have dierent labor productivity levels.
26percent in the last period of the sample), this factor contributes little, about 10 percent, to
catch-up in aggregate productivity across countries (1.3 p.p. of 12.8 p.p. in the model). The
substantial catch-up in agricultural productivity produces a reallocation of labor away from
this sector which dampens its positive eect on aggregate productivity growth.
Substantial has also been the catch-up in industry productivity. Unlike agriculture, this
catch-up has a signicant impact on relative aggregate productivity. Given that most coun-
tries have observed higher growth rates of labor productivity in industry than the United
States, labor reallocation away from industry and toward services is diminished in the coun-
terfactual for industry. On average, the share of hours in industry decreases 6.5 p.p. in the
counterfactual compared to a decrease of 10.3 p.p. in the model. Figure 11 summarizes our
ndings for the eect of this counterfactual on relative aggregate productivity by reporting
the dierence in relative aggregate productivity between the last and the rst period in the
time series for each country. Industry productivity growth is important for countries that
catch-up in aggregate productivity to the United States since these countries are substan-
tially below the 45-degree line. In fact, we draw in this gure a dash-dotted line indicating
half the gains in aggregate productivity in the counterfactual relative to the model. Many
countries are in this category and some countries substantially below it such as Australia,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. For all countries, the average change in relative aggre-
gate productivity is only 6 p.p. in the counterfactual instead of 12.8 p.p. in the model.34 We
conclude from this counterfactual that productivity catch-up in industry explains about 50
percent (6.8 p.p. of 12.8 in the model) of the relative aggregate productivity gains observed
during the sample period.
Recall that, in contrast to agriculture and industry, there has been no substantial catch-
up in services across countries and, as reported in Figure 6, there has been a decline in relative
productivity in services for the richer countries. As a result, even though services represent
an increasing share of output in the economy, we do not expect services to contribute much to
catch-up in the model. This is conrmed in the third counterfactual as productivity catch-up
34Note that among countries that decline in relative productivity the eect of industry growth is not
systematic and the gaps are not as large.
27in services contributes about 15 percent of the catch-up in relative aggregate productivity
(2.4 p.p. of 12.8 p.p. in the model). We note however that for countries that decline in
relative aggregate productivity, lower growth in services than in the United States contributes
substantially to this decline (-6.8 p.p. of -10.5 p.p. in the model, see Table 3). Among
the developed economies { which feature a large share of hours in services { only Canada,
New Zealand, and Sweden had lower productivity growth rates in services than the United
States. In the model, Canada and New Zealand decline in relative aggregate productivity
by 9 and 8 p.p. over the sample period, while Sweden observed a substantial catch-up in
relative aggregate productivity but stagnated at around 82 percent during the mid-1970s.
In the counterfactual, relative aggregate productivity increases by 3 p.p. in Canada, remains
constant for New Zealand, and increases by 9 p.p. from the stagnated level in Sweden. Low
productivity growth in services is essential for understanding these growth experiences of
stagnation and decline among rich economies.
Recall also from Figure 6 that the level of relative productivity in services is lower than
that of industry and that most countries failed to catch-up in services to the relative level
of industry. For instance, the average relative productivity in services increased from 46
percent in the rst period to 49 percent in the last period in the sample, whereas the average
relative productivity in industry increased from 51 percent to 75 percent. In the last period
of the sample, all countries except Austria, France, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and
New Zealand feature lower relative productivity in services than in industry. Moreover, in
many instances the dierences in productivity between services and industry are substantial:
around 40 percent lower in services in Spain, Finland, and Norway, around 60 percent lower
in Portugal, and around 80 percent lower in Korea and Ireland. These features imply that
the service sector represents an increasing drag on aggregate productivity as resources are
reallocated to this sector in the process of structural transformation. To illustrate the role of
low productivity in services and the lack of catch-up in accounting for the growth experiences
of slowdown, stagnation, and decline, we compute a counterfactual where we let productivity
growth in services be such that in the last period in the sample relative productivity in
services is the same as relative productivity in industry in each country. While the impact
28of these dierent productivity growth rates in services on labor reallocation is somewhat
limited, the impact on growth experiences across countries is quite striking: for countries
that catch-up to the United States during the sample period, the average catch-up increases
by almost 80 percent to 46 p.p. while for countries that decline there is instead a catch-
up of 1.6 p.p. during the sample period (see Table 3). More importantly, these summary
statistics hide the impact of productivity in services in explaining experiences of slowdown,
stagnation, and decline observed in the time series. For this reason, Figure 12 plots the time
path of relative aggregate productivity for all country experiences of slowdown, stagnation,
and decline in relative aggregate productivity. The solid lines represent the model and
the dash-dotted lines represent the counterfactual. This gure clearly indicates the extent
to which low productivity in services and the lack of catch-up accounts for all these poor
growth experiences.
To summarize, while productivity convergence in industry (and agriculture) are essential
in the rst stages of the process of structural transformation, the poor relative performance
in services has determined a slowdown, stagnation, and decline in aggregate productivity.
In fact, in the last period of the sample, almost all countries observe a lower relative labor
productivity in services than in aggregate (see Figure 13). Since growth rate dierences
across countries in the service sector tend to be small and services represent a large and
increasing share of hours in most countries, this suggests an increasing role of services in
determining cross-country aggregate productivity outcomes.
4.4 Discussion
Our analysis of the structural transformation and aggregate productivity growth relies on a
collection of closed economies. It is of interest to discuss the limitations and implications
of this assumption for the results. Openness and trade can have two main eects in an
economy. First, competition from trade can aect domestic productivity. Second, for a
small open economy prices of traded goods re
ect world-market conditions and not domestic
productivity.
Regarding the eect of trade on productivity, we argue that the closed-economy assump-
29tion is not as restrictive for our analysis as it may rst appear. To see this point, notice that
the eect of openness on labor allocations and aggregate productivity is already embedded
in the measures of labor productivity growth by sector which the analysis takes as given. For
instance, we found that the growth rate of labor productivity in manufacturing for Korea
was almost 3 times that of the United States. It is likely that openness to trade during
this period can help explain this fact. Moreover, openness would imply that productivity
dierences across countries of those goods that are most tradable would tend to be small
relative to the dierences of those goods that are less traded. The productivity implications
of the model are consistent with this broad prediction since dierences in manufacturing
productivity are smaller than the productivity dierences in services. It is an interesting
question for future research to assess the importance of trade for productivity convergence
in manufacturing across countries and the lack of convergence in services which are mostly
non-traded goods.
Regarding the eect of trade on relative prices, recall that the closed-economy assump-
tion implies a one-to-one mapping from sectoral productivity growth to relative prices. An
open-economy version of the model would tend to produce a weaker link between domestic
productivity growth and relative prices. In fact, in a small-open economy relative prices are
invariant to domestic productivity. As we discussed earlier, the relative price implications
of the model are broadly consistent with the data which suggest that productivity growth
is a substantial component of the movements in relative prices. To put it dierently, we
found a strong correlation between changes in relative prices and labor productivity growth
across countries as documented in Figure 9. As a result, the labor allocations implied by the
model are broadly consistent with the incentives that consumers face in these economies. We
found that not all dierences in relative prices are captured by the model. In particular, we
found that the price of services relative to manufacturing increased faster in the model than
in the data for many countries. This departure of the model from the data may arise not
only from the closed-economy assumption, but also from other features of the data such as
price distortions and barriers to labor reallocation across sectors. It is an interesting ques-
tion why prices of tradable goods are not equalized across countries. The evidence suggests
30large departures from the law of one price. For instance, the price exercise from FAO on
agricultural goods suggests large price dierences across countries (see Prasada Rao (1993))
and the international macro literature documents large deviations in prices even for highly
tradable goods.
Another potential avenue to assess the limitations of the closed-economy assumption of
the model would be to compare the consumption and production implications relative to
data. For instance, in the closed economy output and consumption shares are equal, but
in the open economy they would dier. Unfortunately, this implication cannot be tested
directly since consumption is measured as expenditures in nal goods and any gap between
production and consumption of goods may be due to processing, distribution and marketing
services and other charges. But since for the more developed countries most of the trade oc-
curs intra-industry { dierent cars or wines are shipped to and from countries { consumption
and production shares of broad sectors would tend not to dier greatly in a country.
5 Conclusions
We documented the reallocation of labor over time between agriculture, industry, and services
and the growth of sectoral labor productivity across countries. While countries are going
through a common process of structural transformation, we found that there is substantial
lag dierences in this process. We also found that most countries tend to observe low
productivity growth in services compared to agriculture or manufacturing even though there
is a big variation in sectoral labor productivity growth across countries.
Using a model of the structural transformation that is calibrated to the growth experi-
ence of the United States, we showed that sectoral dierences in labor productivity levels
and growth explain the broad patterns of the process of structural transformation and ag-
gregate productivity experiences across countries. We found that sectoral labor productivity
dierences across countries are large and systematic both at a point in time and over time.
In particular, labor productivity dierences between rich and poor countries are large in
agriculture and services and smaller in manufacturing. Moreover, most countries have ex-
31perienced substantial productivity catch-up in agriculture and industry but productivity in
services has remained low relative to the United States. An implication of these ndings is
that, as countries move through the process of structural transformation, relative aggregate
labor productivity can rst increase (as labor moves from agriculture to industry) and later
stagnate or decline (as labor moves from agriculture and industry to services). We nd that
sectoral productivity dierences can account for the bulk of dierences in the process of
structural transformation and aggregate productivity experiences across countries.
This paper highlights the role of sectoral labor productivity dierences for the structural
transformation and aggregate productivity experiences across countries. We nd that labor
productivity catch-up in manufacturing explains about 50 percent of the gains in aggregate
productivity across countries and that low labor productivity in services and the lack of catch-
up explains all the experiences of slowdown, stagnation, and decline in relative aggregate
productivity across countries. Thus, understanding the sources of cross-country dierences
in labor productivity levels and growth across sectors is crucial. In analyzing sectoral labor
productivity levels and growth rates across countries, a number of interesting questions arise.
What factors contribute to cross-country dierences in labor productivity across sectors?
Why were countries able to catch-up in manufacturing productivity but not in services?
What are the barriers that prevent other developed economies to sustain growth rates of
labor productivity in services as high as in the United States? How are trade openness and
regulation related to these productivity dierences across countries?
While there may not be a unifying explanation for all these observations, a recurrent
theme in productivity studies at the sectoral level is that the threat or actual pressure of
competition is crucial for productivity performance, see for instance Schmitz (2005) and
Gald on-S anchez and Schmitz (2002). Since services are less traded than manufacturing
goods, there is a tendency for services to be less subject to competitive pressure and this
may explain the larger productivity gaps in services relative to manufacturing across coun-
tries. Moreover, protected domestic industries may be the explanation to poor productivity
performance in some countries. Since openness to trade would not generally have the desired
competitive-pressure impact in services, other factors such as the regulatory environment
32may prove useful in explaining productivity dierences across countries in this sector. Poli-
cies aimed at limiting regulations or government interventions that aect competition and
productivity may explain productivity growth dierences in services. For instance, it is often
emphasized the role of land and size regulations aecting productivity in retail services, see
for instance Baily and Solow (2001). As a rst pass in providing some empirical support
for this potential explanation to productivity dierences across countries, we have correlated
labor productivity dierences in industry and services derived from our model to measures
of trade openness and government regulation. We nd that trade openness is strongly cor-
related to industry productivity but less so with services productivity, while measures of
regulation (such as that from the World Bank's Doing Business) are strongly correlated with
productivity in services. We leave a detailed investigation of these important issues for future
research.
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37A Data Sources and Denitions
We build a panel data set with annual observations for aggregate GDP per hour, and
value added per hour and shares of hours for agriculture, industry, and services for 29
countries. The countries covered in our data set are, with sample period in parenthesis,
Argentina (1950-2004), Australia (1964-2004), Austria (1960-2004), Belgium (1956-2004),
Bolivia (1950-2002), Brazil (1950-2003), Canada (1956-2004), Chile (1951-2004), Colombia
(1950-2003), Costa Rica (1950-2002), Denmark (1960-2004), Finland (1959-2004), France
(1969-2003), Greece (1960-2004), Ireland (1958-2004), Italy (1956-2004), Japan (1960-2004),
Korea (1972-2003), Mexico (1950-2004), Netherlands (1960-2004), New Zealand (1971-2004),
Norway (1956-2004), Portugal (1956-2004), Spain (1960-2004), Sweden (1960-2004), Turkey
(1960-2003), United Kingdom (1956-2004), United States (1956-2004), and Venezuela (1950-
2004).
All series are trended using the Hodrick-Prescott lter with a smoothing parameter  =
100 before any ratios are computed.
A.1 Aggregate Data
We obtain data on PPP-adjusted real GDP per capita in constant prices (RGDPL) and
population (POP) from Penn World Tables version 6.2., see Heston, Summers, and Atten
(2006); and we obtain data on employment (EMP) and annual hours actually worked per
person employed (HOURS) from the Total Economy Database, see Conference Board and
Groningen Growth and Development Center (2008a). With these data we construct annual
time series of PPP-adjusted GDP per hour in constant prices for each country as Y Lh =
RGDPL  POP=(EMP  HOURS).
A.2 Sectoral Data
We obtain annual data on employment, hours worked, and constant domestic-price value
added for agriculture, industry, and services for the countries listed above. The sectors are
dened by the International Standard Industrial Classication, revision 3 (ISIC III) deni-
tions, with agriculture corresponding to ISIC divisions 1-5 (agriculture, forestry, hunting,
and shing), industry to ISIC divisions 10-45 (mining, manufacturing, construction, elec-
tricity, water, and gas), and services to ISIC divisions 50-99 (wholesale and retail trade
{ including hotels and restaurants, transport, and government, nancial, professional, and
personal services such as education, health care, and real estate services).
A.2.1 Value Added by Sector
Value added by sector is obtained by combining data from the World Bank (2008), World
Development Indicators online and historical data from the OECD National Accounts publi-
cations for the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States.
38The data series from the World Bank's World Development Indicators are agriculture
value added, industry value added, and services value added. All series are measured in
constant local currency units, base year 2000 (with the exception of Turkey, 1987). These
series are extended backwards using historical data from the OECD National Accounts pub-
lications, except for Korea. A combination of three OECD publications was used: National
Accounts of OECD Countries (1950-1968), National Accounts of OECD Countries (1950-
1961), and National Accounts of OECD Countries (1960-1977). The primary resource was
the book covering the period from 1950 to 1968. We compute growth rates of the OECD
data for corresponding variables for years prior to those available through the World Bank
and apply them to the World Bank series.
Data on value added by sector for all Latin American countries in our data set (Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela) are obtained from the
10-Sector Database (see Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Center
(2008b)). This database has data on value added in constant local prices for 10 sectors.
These data are aggregated into value added in agriculture, industry, and services using the
ISIC III denitions above.
A.2.2 Employment by Sector
The sectoral employment data is obtained from a variety of sources as well. We obtain data
on civilian employment in each broad sector from OECD databases (Labor Force Statistics,
Main Economic Indicators, and Annual National Accounts) for: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain,
Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. Data for Portugal on sectoral employment
is obtained from the Banco de Portugal (2006). The data is aggregated into the same
three broad sectors. We extend this series forward to 2005 by using growth rates for each
variable computed from EUKLEMS Database (2008). Data for Korea and all Latin American
countries is obtained from the 10-Sector Database (see Conference Board and Groningen
Growth and Development Center (2008b)). We aggregate this data into the three broad
sectors using the ISIC III denitions above.
A.2.3 Hours Worked by Sector
We obtain data on hours of work per worker from the EUKLEMS Database (2008) for Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. This data cover the period
1970 to 2005. Data for Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Greece, Mexico, Nor-
way, New Zealand, and Turkey is obtained from International Labour Oce (2008), Laborsta
database. These series are much shorter; the time period covered varies by country but it
starts after 1990 for all countries.
From these data, we compute the ratio of per-worker hours by sector relative to per-
worker aggregate hours. In analyzing these ratios, we nd that relative sectoral hours are
remarkably stable over time for most countries and that these ratios are very close to one
for many countries. Moreover, any deviations from one in relative hours across countries
39are not systematically related to the level of development. For each country, we use the
average value of each of these ratios, denoted as hi, i = a;m;s, to calculate shares of hours
by sector and value added per hour by sector. Since the time series of sectoral hours are
shorter than those of sectoral employment and value added, this simplication allows us to
compute sectoral shares of total hours and value added per hour without shortening the time
series. We do not have data on sectoral hours for Argentina, Bolivia, Korea, and Venezuela
and we assume that hi = 1 for these countries.
Total hours by sector are computed by multiplying employment with hours per worker
in each sector. We construct value added per hour by dividing the series of value added with
the corresponding series of total hours for each sector. Shares of hours by sector are simply
the ratio of total hours by sector relative to total aggregate hours.
A.2.4 Prices by Sector
We compute implicity price de
ators for each sector using data on sectoral value added
at constant and current prices from the World Development Indicators. The price data is
consistent with the sectoral denitions for labor productivity. It covers the period from 1971
to 2004.




t=1957 fg Productivity growth in agriculture
fAm;tg2004
t=1957 fg Productivity growth in industry
fAs;tg2004
t=1957 fg Productivity growth in services
a 0.01 Long-run share of hours in agriculture
 a 0.11 Share of hours in agriculture 1956
 s 0.89 Share of hours in industry 1956
b 0.04 Share of hours in industry 1957-2004
 -1.5 Aggregate productivity growth
41Table 2: Sectoral Growth, Labor Reallocation, and Aggregate Productivity
Change in Relative
Change in Share of Hours Aggregate
Agriculture Industry Services Productivity
All countries:
Model -25.5 -10.3 38.8 12.8
Counterfactual:
(1) 
a = 0 2.1 -13.7 11.6 -0.5
(2) 
m = 0 -25.5 7.3 18.2 -7.0
(3) 
s = 0 -25.2 -11.8 36.9 -2.2
(4) 
i = 
US -16.8 -4.7 21.5 0.4
Catch-up countries:
Model -24.3 -13.5 37.8 25.8
Counterfactual:
(1) 
a = 0 4.9 -17.3 12.4 7.9
(2) 
m = 0 -24.3 9.5 14.8 -1.5
(3) 
s = 0 -23.8 -15.6 39.4 4.0
(4) 
i = 
US -13.3 -4.5 17.8 1.6
Decline countries:
Model -27.6 -4.5 32.1 -10.5
Counterfactual:
(1) 
a = 0 -2.9 -7.2 10.1 -15.7
(2) 
m = 0 -27.6 3.3 24.3 -16.8
(3) 
s = 0 -27.6 -4.9 32.5 -13.3
(4) 
i = 
US -23.2 -5.1 28.2 -1.9
The table reports the average change between the last and rst period in the time series (in
percentage points) of each variable for the model and the counterfactuals. Counterfactuals
(1) to (3) assume zero growth in labor productivity in a sector leaving the other sectoral
growth rates as in the data. Counterfactual (4) assumes labor productivity growth in each
sector equal to the aggregate productivity growth in the United States.
42Table 3: Change in Relative Aggregate Productivity
All Catch-up Decline
countries countries countries






(1a) Agriculture 11.5 23.2 -9.4
(1b) Industry 6.0 13.9 -8.4




i 8i 3.9 5.8 0.5
(3) Catch-up in Services 30.7 46.9 1.6
The table reports the average change between the last and rst period in the time series (in
percentage points) of relative aggregate productivity for the model and the counterfactuals.
Counterfactuals (1a) to (1c) set the growth rate in a sector to the rate in the United States
in that sector. Counterfactual (2) sets the growth rate of all sectors to the sectoral growth
rates in the United States. Counterfactual (3) sets the productivity growth in services such
that in the last period in the sample relative productivity in services is the same as relative
productivity in industry in each country.
43Figure 1: Relative GDP per Hour { Some Countries








































Note: GDP per hour in each country relative to that of the United States.
44Figure 2: Shares of Hours { Some Countries



































45Figure 3: Sectoral Growth Rates of Labor Productivity (%)
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Annualized Growth Rate of Aggregate Labor Productivity
Note: Aggregate labor productivity is GDP per hour while sectoral labor productivity is
value added per hour in each sector. Annualized percentage growth rates during the sample
period for each country. The horizontal lines indicate the sectoral growth rates observed in
the United States and the vertical line indicates the aggregate growth rate of the United
States.
46Figure 4: Share of Hours by Sector - Model vs. U.S. Data

































47Figure 5: Relative Labor Productivity across Sectors - rst year







































Quintile of Aggregate Productivity (first year)
Note: Labor productivity relative to the level of the United States.
48Figure 6: Relative Labor Productivity across Sectors - rst and last years








































Quintile of Aggregate Productivity (first year)
Note: Labor productivity relative to the level of the United States.
49Figure 7: Model vs. Data Across Countries { Levels in the last year


























































































































Note: Each plot reports the value for each variable in the last period for the model and the
data.








































































Share of Hours in Industry





































































Note: Each plot reports the change between the last and rst period (in percentage points)
of each variable during the sample period in the data and in the model.
51Figure 9: Changes in Relative Prices (%)





































































Note: Each gure reports the annualized percentage change of the variable in the time series
in the data and in the model. Relative price of agriculture and services refer to the price of
agriculture and services relative to industry. Data on relative prices cover the period 1971
to 2004.
























































































































































































Note: Counterfactuals (1) to (3) set the growth rate of labor productivity in a sector to zero
in all countries, leaving the other sectors as in the data for agriculture (rst column), industry
(second column), and services (third column). Counterfactual (4) sets labor productivity
growth in each sector to aggregate productivity growth in the United States. Each panel
plots the change between the last and the rst period in the time series (in percentage
points) of the share of hours in each sector and relative aggregate productivity in the model
and in the counterfactual.
53Figure 11: Change in Relative Aggregate Productivity { The Importance of Industry




















































Note: This counterfactual sets the growth of labor productivity in industry in each country
to the rate in the United States. The gure plots the dierence between the last and rst
period (in percentage points) of relative aggregate productivity during the sample period in
the model and in the counterfactual.



























































































Note: This counterfactual sets the productivity growth in services such that in the last
period in the sample relative productivity in services is the same as relative productivity in
industry in each country. Each panel plots aggregate labor productivity relative to that of
the United States in the model and the counterfactual for each country which, during the
sample period, experienced an episode of slowdown, stagnation, or decline. The solid line
represents the model and the dash-dotted line the counterfactual.
55Figure 13: Labor Productivity in Services across Countries { Last Period






















































































Note: This gure plots relative labor productivity in services against relative aggregate
productivity in the last period of the sample for all countries.
56